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THE LAW SCHOOL
On June 16, 1924, the One Hundredth Anniversary of the founding
of the Yale Law School was celebrated by appropriate exercises which
were attended by several hundred graduates. Dean Swan presided and
addresses were delivered by Professor Emeritus Theodore S. Woolsey,
Hon. Harlan F. Stone, Attorney General of the United States, and
Hon. George W. Wickersham, Attorney General during President-Taft's
administration. These addresses will shortly be published in a small
volume.
The School begins its second century with an encouraging increase
[o)
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iri the enrollment, particularly in the entering class. A comparison of
this year's registration with that of last year follows:
19?3-24 1924-25
Graduate Class ........................ ; ...... 12 13
Third Year Class ............................. 102 I1
Second Year Class ............ ............. oI 82
First Year Class ............................. 75 132
Students from other departments of the University 40 70
330 408
It has been found necessary to divide into two sections the First Year
class which, including Yale College seniors, numbers 197. The size of
this class supplies a potent argument for the imperative need of a new
building in the near future. No room in the present building will seat
more than 150.
Degrees from ninety-seven colleges and universities are represented
by the student body. Those institutions having four or more graduates
registered in the School are: Boston College, 4; Brown University, 4;
University of California, 5; Catholic University, 6; Clark Univer-
sity, 6; Cornell University, 6; Dartmouth College, 8; Georgetown
University, io; Harvard College, 4; Holy Cross College, i7; Univer-
sity of Michigan, 5; University of Pennsylvania, 6; Princeton Univer-
sity, 7; Syracuse University, 6; Trinity College, 8; Ursinus College, 4;
Vanderbilt University, 8; Wesleyan University, 9; Yale College, ioI.
The 1924 summer session was much the most successful in point of
numbers of any yet held. It was attended by 124 students during the
first term and 1I 5 the second. The experiment of offering graduate
law cotirses during the summer attracted a number of law teachers
and will be repeated in 1925. The summer instruction was given by
six members of the Yale Faculty, and in addition Professor E. W.
Hinton of the University of Chicago and Assistant Professor M. S.
Breckinridge of Western Reserve University.
For the coming year the Faculty remains the same as last year with
three additions. Assistant Professor Wesley A. Sturges has been
called from the University of Minnesota. Mr. Sturges is a graduate
of the University of Vermont. He obtained the LL.B. degree from
Columbia Uni.ersity in I9i9, and the J.D. degree cum laude from Yale
in 1923. He taught at Yale during the summers of 1922-and 1923,
and the many friends he -then made will welcome his return. Mr.
William B. Gumbart, LL.B. Yale 1915, of the New Haven tar has been
appointed a Le.cturer on Connecticut Law and Practice-a course which
was formerly given by Judge Beach but omitted from the curriculum
last yeai'because.of his retirement. Mr. John Caskey, who was gradu-
ated from the School with honors in June, -1924, has returned on a
Teaching Fellowship, and will give the course on Persons and part of
the course on Contracts during the second term, while Professor Corbin
enjoys a sabbatical leave of absence.
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THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF IUS TERTII IN
REPLEVIN
Although numerous instances may be found of replevin of men' and
of land," the action seems to have received, impetus m.inly in connec-
tion with the distraint of beasts' and other chattels. 4  Distress5 was a
conspicuous mode of self-help and developed when methods of judi-
cial compulsion were still in their formative stages.6 But even at an
early period seizures were being made under a semi-judicial sanction.
This characteristic of self-help as a proceeding persisted, accompanied,
however, by limitations on the privileges and powers of the distraihior.8
' See Assise of Clarendon, II66, c. 3, Adams and Stephens, Select Documents of
English Constitutional History (192o) i4, 15; Munintenta Gildhallae (243) 113.
Cf. (409) Y. B. ii Hen. IV, 13.29; (1469) Y. B. 9 Edw. IV, 41.25.. For a form
of the writ de hoinine replegiando, see Bracton, f. 154.
'(1194) 1 Rot. Cur. Reg. 32.
'See (1229) Bracton's Notebook (Maitland's ed. x887) p1. 333.
'-For cases before the period of the Year Books, see (circa II89-I199) Abbre-
viatio Placitormn, i2b; (1231) Bracton's Notebook (Maitland's ed. 1887) pl. 616.
Distress was resorted to in most instances for the enforcement of duties owing
by the vassal to his lord. See (1292) Y. B. 2o & 2r Edw. I (R. S.) i3o (relief
in respect of socage land) ; (1292) Y. B. 20 & 21 Edw. I. (R. S.) 336 (rent) ;
(1292) Y. B. 20"& 21 Edw. I (PR S) 352 (teA6ment charged with suit) ; (1293,)
Y. B. 21 & 22 Edw. I (R. S.) 56 (services in arrear); (1307) Y. B. 33-35 Edw. I
(R. S.) 540 (rent); (13o8) Y. B. I & 2 Edw. II (17 S. S.) 37 (relief in
respect of knight's fee held by homage and scutage) ; (1310) Y. B. 3 & 4 Edw. II
(22 S S.) 17.5 (homage arrear); (1310) Y. 'B. 3 & 4 Edw. II (22 S. S.) 197
(chantiy arrear). But it was being extended in scope and used to enforce pecu-
niary ob'igations imposed by the body politic, as where the distrainee was amerced.
(1293) Y. B 21 & 22 Edw. I (R. S.) 24 (highway stopped by foss); see (1292)
Y. B. 20 & 21 Edw. I (R. S.) 296 (default by man in decennary). See also
(1292) Y B. 2o & 21 Edw. I (R. S.) 3o6 (cutting cloth, privilege accorded only
to freemen by local custom). Arid cf. (1292) Y. B. 20 & 21 Edw. I (R. S.) 82
(pledge, or surety, called upon to make satisfaction on account of default by bailee
of royal moneys). Beasts damage feasant could he distrained. Bracton. f. 155b;
see (1292) Y. B. 20 & 21 Edw. I (R. S.) 62; cf. (1304) Y. B. 32 & 33 Edw. I
(R. S ) 122. And so by a mere tenant at sufferance. (1489) Y. B. 4 Hen. VII,
3. 6.
a2 Kocourek and Wigmore, Evohtion of Law (1915) 597, 598. The section in
this work dealing with the present subject is reprinted from Maine, Early History
of Instit"tions (1875) 250-305, passim.
'2 Kocourek and Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 6 at p. 598. Since most of the
overlords had their own manorial courts and their justiciables were "recruited from
their own- tenants, the process of distress was at once judicial and proprietary.
"A right [poweri to distrain a man into coming before your court to answer why
he has not paid his rent may in favourable circumstances become a right [power]
to distrain him for not paying his rent" 2 Pollock and Maitland, History of
Ine';sh Law (895) 574.
" The circumstances occasionng distress might be very restricted. Thus in
(1292) Y. B. 20 & 21 Edw. I (R. S.) 338, where town presentors were distrained
for concealing the hue and cry, Metingbam, 3., said: "We think that no one can try
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When the latter stepped beyond the recognized bounds or when his
demand was disputed, -a need clearly arose for counter-relief. The
form which that relief was to take was influenced in no slight degree
by the early crystallizing theories as to the nature of the property inter-
est acquired by the distrainor in the distress.9
Text writers seerii agreed that the distrainor's interest in the chattel
was a very qualified one; that he might retain control over it only as
security for the satisfaction of his demand .10 and that it was not in
his "possession,'! but merely "in custodia legis:"11 That interest the jus-
tices and lawyers of the fourteenth century in particular rather uni-
concealment except beform a Justice in Eyre; and that by the criers." In ('3)
Y. B. 21 & 22 Edw. I (R. S.) 8, it is said -'that, if a man who is seised of rent
by the hand of his tenant lease that rent to one B. [for years] . . . .and the
tenant on that assignment attons to him and does fealty to him and pays to him
that rent; the said B., it the rent be in arrear for any term, can not distrein the
tenant for the arrears out of his fee without a specialty from the lessor who has
power to grant the right, to wit, that he may distrein the tenement, althbugh it be
not within his fee.-(All this is true, unless by the custom of some viii or place it
be lawful for him in such a case to.distrein without, viz. although he does not bind
the tenement to distress by that special clause inserted in his writing.)" If rent
were in arrear for three terms and the lord took distress for the first term and the
tenant brought replevin and "the lord avowed for that term and the tenant pleaded
outside his fee or anything else putting the seigniory in question, the former might
not take distress for the other terms until the seigniory had been tried. (1405)
Y. B. 7 H6n IV, 4, z4.
If the distrainee tendered homage to the distrainor, homage 'arrear being the
reason for the distress, the latter would be under a duty to return the chattels.
See (310) Y. B. 3 & 4 Ed.w, II (22 S. S.) i75. Or offered security (gage and
pledge) that the demand be tried in a judicial proceeding. 2 Pollock and Maitland,
loc. cit. supra note 7; see i ibid. 334. Hence, in many writs of replevin is found
the allegation: "..... .and still detains against gage and pledges." See cases
cited infra note 58. See also 3 Holdsworth, History of English Law (3d ed. 1923)
283. The lord might neither sell nor use the beasts. 2 Pollock and Maitland,
loc. cit supra note 7. Nor take whatever goods fie pleased. Exemptions were
"'entailed by the very nature of the whole proceeding, since without the instruments
of tillage or handicraft the debtor could never pay his debt." 2 K6courek and
Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 6; at p. 594.
' What that property interest was is also fairly inferred from the facts stated
supra note 8.
i. r Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. siupra note 7 at p. 334; 2 Kocourek and
Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 6 at p. 592; Ames, "Disseisin of Chattels," 3 Select
Essays in Anglo-American Legal History (909) .541, 551.
"3 Holdsworth, loc. cit. supra note 8; '2 Pollock and Maitland, loc. cit. supra
note 7. Blackstone says that "in the case of a distress, the goods ari from the
first taking in the custody of the law, and not merely in that of the distrainor."
3 Commenfaries, 146. Cf. Ame§, "The History of Trover," 3 op. ct. supra note
io at p. 431. "And to say that he has property or possession in the distress, that is
not so: for the pound is an indifferent place between them, and the defendant is
not forceably restrained from its occupation so long as he has paid his rent: and
if a stranger takes them outside of the fark .... the tenant will have an action
of Trespass, Sor the property remains in him." (1504) Y. B. 2o Hen. VII, i, i.
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formly called "seisin." 12 Although Maitland concludes that they
showed "a remarkable determination to make that seisin which the law
protects just a real and actual possession,"'" the fact is thatsociety did
not attach to the distrainor's custody the ordinary incidents of posses-
sion.14 Consequently, there was a development of forms of action to
afford relief in cases of intermeddling with the distrainor's control of
the chattels-rescous,' 5 de parco fracto.16  But much earlier than these,
"And Wa'ter cannot deny that he is seised of the said ox, and that he did not
suffer the ox to be delivered under the King's writ [of replevin]." (13o8-9) Y. B.
I & 2 Edw. II (17 S. S.) 65, 69.
" Maitland, The Seisin of Chattels (1885) i L. QuAnT. REV. 324, 335. "So long
as possession has legal consequences some persons will always.be trying to substitute
mummery for the real thing." Ibid. But see infra note I4. It might be urged
that inasmuch as replevin antedated trespass, the fact that trespass was not avail-
ab'e to the distrairor would not necessari!y point to the inference that he did not
have possession. But even after trespass had become a fully developed action,
there was great reluctance to use it for redressing a wrongful distress. See infra
note 44 and text following. Such reluctance may be traced to the divergent nature
of the property interest acquired by the distrainor from that by the trespasser. In
a case of replevin there was talk of possession by the defendant. (146o) Y. B. 39
Hen. VI, 35-47. But it does not appear whether the defendant was a distrainor or
a trespasser. At this time, replevin was being occasionally used for.the specific
restitution of goods held under an assertion of title. See infra note 38. Perhaps
"seisin" meant no more than a detention preceded by a taking. Cf. (1454) Y. B.
33 Hen. VI, 52.39 (".. . . non obstante ceo jeo purrai eux reseisir auxibien .... .").
Maitland himself has shown how the expression "uncore seisi" was gradually
replaced by others more realistic---"il detient a tort," "uncore detient." Op. cit.
supra at p. 330.
" Thus, he could not maintain trespass against any one who meddled with it.
Ames, Lectures on Legal History (913) 64. But see the dissent of Vavisor, J., in
(504) Y. B. 2o Hen. VII, i.i. Nor trover. Ames, loc. cit. supra note ii. See
also supra note 13.
a' "Rescous is a writ that lies when any man takes a distress, and another takes
it again from him, and will not suffer him to carry the distress away; this is a
rescous, upon which he .... shall recover damages." Rastell, Les Termnes de la
Ley (ist Amer. ed. 1812) 346, 347; cf. 3 Blackstone, loc. cit. supra note ii. See.
also Ames, loc. cit. supra note 14; loc. ci. supra note ii. Property in this distress
was laid either in the distrainee or not in any one at all. Ames, loc. cit. supra
note io. On the application of the writ, see (1343-4) Y. B. 17 & I8 Edw. III
(R. S.) 468; (1343-4) Y. B. 17 & x8 Edw. III (R. S.) 470; (x349) Y. B. 24
Edw. III, 34.30; (1350) Y. B. 25 Edw. III, 81.8; (1364) Y. B. 39 Edw. III,
35.--; (1365) Y- B. 40 Edw. III, 32.14; (1401) Y. B. 2 Hen. IV, 15.Ig; (401)
Y. B. 2-Hen. IV, 36.23; (1401) 2 Hen. IV,.22.5; (1411) Y. B. 13 Hen. IV, 4.8;
(i425) Y. B. 3 Hen. VI, 52.20; (i444) Y. B. 22 Hen. VI, 37.4; (444) 22 Hen.
VI, 54-30; (1460) Y. B. 39 Hen. VI, 7.11; (1465) Y. B. 5 Edw. IV, 6.I; (1466)
Y. B. 6 Edw. IV, 4.32; (1467) Y. B. 6 Edw. IV, 11.8; (1467) 7 Edw. IV, 18.15;
(1467) Y.B. 7 Edw. IV, f9.i8; (3.468) Y. B. 7 Edw. IV, 24.32; (1475) i5 Edw.
IV, 9.14; (1491) Y. B. 6 Hen. VII, 14.4; (1494) Y. B. 9 Hen. VII, 3.4; (ISOI)
Y. B. x6 Hen. VII, 14.11; see also (1504) Y. B. 2o Hen. VII, i.i. The taking
from the distrainor was considered a tort si et armis. (1369) Y. B. 44 Edw. III,
2o.8; (1428) Y. B. 7 Hen. VI, 1.5; cf. (14o6) Y: B. 8 Hen. IV, I.i. Therefore,
a count for assault and battery of the servant was not improper. (1344) Y. B.
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in the thirteenth century, an action had been developing for the specific
restitution of the chattel to the distrainor 17 involving of necessity a pro-
ceeding to test the validity of the distrainor's demand. The royal plea
of vetitum namii, or vee de nam,'8 that was being entertained by the
courts when the distrainor failed to deliver up the distress on tender of
security, 9 marked the beginning of an appropriate form of action.
20
It ultimately evolved into a comparatively complete remedy known as
replevin, 21 a climax in that remedial development. 22  Trespass, how-
i8 Edw. III (R. S.) 39o; (1344) Y. B. i8 Edw. III (R S.) 394; cf. (406)
Y. B. 8 Hen. IV, i.i.
This served the same purpose as rescou, but it was used only where the goods
were actually impounded. 3 Blackstone, loc. cit. supra note xi. See Ames, loc. cit.
.upra note 1o; loc. cit. supra note ii; loc. cit. supra note 14. Here too the tort
was zi et armis. I Fitzherbert, Natura Brevium (9th ed. 1794) ioo F. Among
the cases see (1439) Y. B. 18 Hen. VI, 21.6 (by statute) ; (1442) Y. B. 2o Hen.
VI, 37.7; (1481) Y. B. 21 Edw. IV, 54.24; (504) 20 Hen. VII, .I. "If the
husband distrain for rent or services which he hath in right of his wife, and a
stranger take them out of the pound, the husband shall have the writ de parco
fracto in his own name; but yet it seemeth he may sue the same in his name, and
in the name of his wife, and join the wife with him." i Fitzherbert, op. cit. supra
at p. ioiB.
An action on the case was allowed where one was prevented from taking distress.
".... if one come to arrest a man, or to distrain, and he be prevented from doing
it, he shall not have a writ of rescous, but an action on the case." i Fitzherbert,
op. cit. supra at p. 1O2 F. Or even where goods already distrained were taken back
by force; ".... and shall therein, if the distress were taken for rent, recover
treble damages." 3 Blackstone, loc. cit. supra note ii.
" Or for damages, as such relief did become available in replevin. In an early
case, (1292) Y. B. 20 & 21 Edw. I (R S.) 62, the plaintiff recovered damages
in addition to his beasts.
The meaning of these expressions is brought out by the following extract from
i Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra note 7 at p. 334: "He [the distrainor] may
not appropriate the namium, the thing that has been taken .... ; he must just keep
it as a gage (vadium). . ."
"Supra note 8; Bracton, f. i58b. See 2 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra
note 7 at p. 575.
There might be circumstances where replevin, the action into which vetitum
namii finally developed, would not lie. Thus, in (1294) Y. B. 21 & 22 Edw. I
(R. S.) 396, it is said "that, if one distrein another to do suit to his court when
he is not bouind thereto by his feoffment, he (the distreined), although he have
done the suit on account of the distress, may bring the Prohibition formed in the
terms of the statute forbidding him to distrein contrary to the terms of the feoff-
ment; and. if the lord do nbt cease thereon, he shall have a writ of Attachment
against the lord: but this matter cannot be tried by the Replegiari after the lord
has been (whether rightfully or wrongly) seised of the services. And in like
manner if an Abbat or a Prior or a man in religion be distreined to do suit to a
View of Frankpledge."
' "Replegiare is compounded of re and plegiare, as much as to say. as to redeliver
upon pledges or sureties; -and in the statute of Marlebridge. deliberare is used for
replegiare." Coke, Littleton, i45b. The proceedings up to and including replevin
may be described briefly as follows: while the cattle were on their way to the
pound, the owner had a limited privilege of rescue. Once impounded, he might:
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ever, a later action, was barred because of the prevailing theory about
the jural relations which resulted from the taking of distress ;28 so were
appeal of larceny24 and detinue.
2 5
But in spite of the cleavage which' was apparent between trespass and
replevin, there was evidence of a tendency to make them interchange-
able: trespass for a wrongful distress, replevin for any wrongful tak-
ing. The early theories, too, were being altered; the distrainor was
being changed from a mere custodian into a jealous possessor.2' To be
(i) discharge the distrainor's demand;- (2) tender security for release of the
distress; or (3) remain inactive, disputing the demand. If the distrainor refused
to make deliverance 'and allow the sheriff a view of the impounded cattle, he was
deemed to have broken the king's peace and the sheriff raised the hue and cry after
him. 2 Kocourek and Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 6 at pp. 592, 593. Replevin
might be either by plaint to the sheriff or by the king's writ. Cf. Gilbert, Dis-
tresses and Replevin (2d ed. 1780) 98, 99. For forms of the writ, see Glanville,
Bk XII, c. 12; Bracton, f. 157.
The writ of uiithernam would issue for taking cattle or other goods of the
distrainor to double the value of those of the distrainee when the latter's had been
taken beyond the jurisdiction. 2 Kocourek and Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 6 at
P. 593; Rastell, op. cit. supra note 15 at p. 39o. Cf. 2 Rolle, Abridgment (1668)
431 (H) 2 ff. "In Replevin if the Defendant claims property, upon which Issues
a writ de proprietate probanda, and the sheriff returns that the property is to the
Plaintiff and that the Defendant has led off the cattle, a Withernam will be
granted." 2 ibid., 435 (Q). On the apFli ation of the writ, see (1345) Y. B. ig
Edw. III (R. S.) 472 (.withernam ordered because view could not be had) (1405)
Y. B. 7 Hen. IV, 27.5. For a full discussion of replevin, see i Chitty, Pleading
(I6th Amer. ed. 1879) *18I-*I86.
'Where a man was distrained twice for one thing, the writ of recaption lay.
Rastell, op. cit. supra note 15 at p. 335. In (1344-5) Y. B. 18 & 19 Edw. III
(R. S.) 5oo, 5o8, the plaintiff's allegation in A writ of recaption that the beasts
were taken from his villeins against the peace was considered proper, .Willoughby,
J., saying that the writ was "as gopd as a Replevin in the case." And see (313)
Y. B. 6 & 7 Edw. II (36 S. S.) 236; (1370-1.) Y. B. 45 Edw. iii, 48; (372)
Y. B. 47 Edw. III, 22.52; (1432) Y. B. ii Hen. VI, 8.16.
' See supra notes I1, 23, 14. "Trespass presupposed the property in the defen-
dant, whereas replevin assumed the property in the plaintiff at the time of action
brought." Ames, loc. cit. supra note IO.
"Cf. Ames, op. cit. supra note 14, at pp. 67, 68; (I344-5) Y. B. 18 & i9 Edw.
III (R. S.) 500, 5o8, in which counsel said: "A writ of Trespass and a writ of
Appeal are given .... also to one out of whose possession the goods are taken."
"Yet property was supposed to remain in the plaintiff. See (249o) Y. B. 6 Hen.
VII, 7.4. And if thd plaintiff tendered compensation for damage by cattle taken
damage- feasant after they had been impounded, detinue alone would lie for the
defendant's refusal to make delivery. (1412) Y. B. 13 Hen. IV, 17.14. Cf. 3
Blackstone, op. cit. supra note ii, at p. *151.
Arguments of counsel so tend to show "...when, the husband distrained for
the rent arrear, and was in possession of the said distress, and then the defendants
made a rescue from him, that was a personal tort done to the husband, . . . . so
there is reason that the husband alone punish for 'this tort, .... but otherwise is it
where the husband is not in possession, as if the husband be seised in right of his
wife of a rent, if the husband is to make avowry of the rent, it is necessary that
the avowry be made in both their names, for the husband was not yet possessor of
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sure, a taking under any circumstances, if by force and arms and
against the peace, would ,support trespass.2 7  So would the action lie
against one who was not a bailiff at the time he purported to take dis-
tress ;28 against a distrainor who made use of the distress. 2  Certain
other types of wrongful distress were deemed trespassory: distraint in
the king's highway or out of the limits of one's fee ;3o distraining and
driving away at night ;31 taking for a rent charge extinct because
the rent, but here the husband was in possession for which it is proper for him
alone to sue this writ." (475) Y. B. 15 Edw. IV, 9.14. The dissent of Vavisor,
J., in (5o4) Y. B. 2o Hen. VII, i.a indicates this trend. But cf. supra note 13.
If trespass were brought for a taking by force and arms, there would be little
difficulty in considering the defendant a possessor. (14o9) Y . B. ii Hen. IV,
23.46.
' In the following cases, it was so urged by the plaintiff, although the defendant
had ostensibly merely taken distress: (1339) Y. B. 13 & 14 Edw. III (R. S.)
i9o (distress for rent arrear) ; (340) Y. B. 14 Edw. III (R. S.) 86 (distress
for royal tax) ; (340) Y. B. 14 Edw. III (L S.) 88 (suit in arreair) ; "(340)
Y. B. 14 & 15 Edw. III (R. S.) 212 (three pots, one pan and two tables distrained
for rent arrear) ; (1342) Y. B. 16 Edw. III (II R. S.) 256 (services in
arrear) ; (344) Y. B. 18 Edw. III (R. S.) 226 (heriot) ; (345) Y. B. 19 Edw.
III (R. S.) 132 (weir, for which rent arrear, broken and timber carried off);
(363) Y. B. 38 Edw. III, 35-; (1369) Y. B. 44 Edw. III, 13 :8 (heriot after
death of certain tenant) ; (2404) Y. B. 5 Hen. IV, 2.9 (sheep damage feasant) ;
cf. (1338) Y. B. I & 12 Edw. III (R. S.) 590; (338) Y. B. 12 & 13 Edw. III
(R. S.) 66; (1344) Y. B. 18 Edw. III (R. S.) 230 (heriot); (24o6) Y. B. 8
Hen. IV, 15.6 (services in arrear). Often the question whether the taking had
been against the peace or not would be a very vital issue. See (I352-,3) Lib. Ass.
(27 Edw. III), 143.66.
Trespass would lie against a sheriff who made deliverance in replevin of goods
belonging not to the plaintiff in replevin, but to a stranger, since the latter, not
being a party to the writ of replevin, could not sue out a writ de proprietate
probanda. (423) Y. B. 14 Hen. IV, 24-32; (1477) Y. B. 16 Edw. IV, 2O.2.
I See (14o6) Y. B. 7 Hen. IV, 34.2. But in this case the court made the
following distinction: ". . . . if the defendant took them claiming property by
heriot to himself, although the Lord afterwards agreed to that taking for services
due to him, still he cannot be called his bailiff for that time. But [if] he had taken
without command for services due to the Lord. and the Lord afterwards had
agreed to the taking, he will be adjudged as bailiff, although he was his bailiff at
no time before that taking." Cf. (42o) Y. B. ii Hen. IV, 8944.
" See (r483) Y. B. 22 Edw. IV, 47.12: ". . . . if a man distrain my horse for
service due, or for damage feasant, or [any] other thing, and then he put it to
husbandry, or in [any] other manner of occupation, that occupation makes the
taking tortious and punishable by writ of Trespass." See also 2 Pollock and
Maitland. loc. cit. supra note 7.
S(2304) Y. B 32 & 33 Edw. I (R. S.) 132; (1312) Y. B. 5 Edw. II (33 S. S.)
233; (1312-3) Y. B. 6 Edw. II (34 S. 9.) 142; (1345) Y. B. 29 Edw. III (R. S.)
472 (statute mentioned): (14o6) Y. B. 8 Hen. IV, 25.6; cf. (2341) Y. B is
Edw. III (R. S ) 25o. But if a man held by certain services in one county certain
lands of a manor in another, the distress taken for the services might be brought
to the manor in the other county. (1422) Y. B. i Hen. VI. 3.9 (distress, trespass
vi et arnis against bailiff).
" (1338) Y. B. 11-12 Edw. III (R. S.) 582.
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the distrainor had neither seignory nor fee ;32 distraining certain pro-
hibited chattels.33, Retaking the distress from the distrainor was
deemed trespassory.34 One case may be found where trespass was
brought for a wrongful distress with apparently no objection by either
court or opposing counsel ;35 and there is a dictum justifying the pro-
cedure. 6 In 1447, a statute was enacted providing for the use of tres-
pass against distrainors within a limited area for four years in view of
the fact that replevin was proving' inadequate.3 7  But replevin was
nevertheless covering a wider field of tortious taldngs.38 Though both
' (1341) Y. B. IS Edw. III (M. S.) 306.
" "Note that for services arrear a man cbnnot avow a distress made upon corn
in shocks or on hay, and he who is thus distrained shall have -his writ of trespass."
(1310) Y. B. 3 Edw. II (20 S. S.) 2o; (1343-4) Y. B. 17 & 18 Edw. III (R. S.)
634 (beasts of the plow,. statute mentioned). Cf. supra note 8. Nor could part of
the realty be distrained. (1522-3) Y. B. 14 Hen. VIII, 25.6 (millstone, trespass).
(1425) Y. B. 3 Hen. VI, 52.2 (taking by force). But this would apparently
concede the distrainor to be in possession. See supra note 26; and cf. sapra notes
14, 15.
' (I369) Y. B. 4 Edw. 111, 13.27. In this case, the final issue was whether the
King was seised of certain land, it being apparently tacitly understood that no
one might take distress on the King's possession. Probably this latter fact made
the taking trespassory. And cf. (414) Y. B. 2 Hen. V, 11.12; (1491) Y. B. 7
Hen. VII, I.L
I See (1341) Y. B. 15 Edw. III (R. S.) xi8, where Srharshulle, J., said that
trespass lay for distraint by the lord paramount when there was nothing in arrear.
15 Rot. Par. 139, 140 (25, VII). It provided that "if any man here after, take
any such Catell of his owne wronge and auctoritee, within any of the said Shires,
and slee theim, sell theim, or yeve them, or putte theym away, so that the owners
of theim may noght come to have replevyn of theim, that thei to whom the propurte
of the same Cateli was at the tyme of such takyng, may have an action of trespasse
ayenst such takers, and ayenst all thaym, to whom the possession of such Catell so
taken comes, within any of the said Shires, joyntly or severally, thai knowyng
such Catell comyng to their possession, so to be taken or put awaye." The plaintiff
would recover treble damages and costs. In view of the provision, "of his own
wronge," it seems this statute was little more than declaratory of the common
law. See supra note 27 and text preceding. In (1149) Y. B. 28 Hen. VI, 5.24,
trespass was brought where the defendants had taken goods damage feasant. But
the parties were at issue on whether the defendants had converted them to their
own use or not.
See the remarks of Bereford, C. J., in (1312-3) Y. B. 6 Edw. 1I (34 S. S.)
I42, I43: "Surme(times) one brings one's replegiare where one could have used a
writ of trespass if one had wished, but one takes this writ because one can come
quicker by one's chattels by the replegiare."_ At p. 147, he adds: "I should hold
for a fool a man who brings a writ of trespass, supposing that he is deprived of
his chattel, where he can bring the replegiare to have the delivery of his chattel.
But nevertheless it is not as though he would not be received if he actually did
bring the writ of trespass." And in Coke, Littleton, I45b, it is said: "In a speciall
case a man may have a replevyn of goods not distreyned. As if the mesne put in
his cattell in lieu of the cattell of the tenant paravaile, that he is bound to acquite,
he shall have a replevyn of those.cattell that never were disreyned." Cf. (1414)
- Y. B. 2 Hen. V, i.i.
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actions were still subjected to much contrast,.9 the lawyers of the period
of the Year Books never tired of drawing analogies.40  Chief Justice
Bereford has blazing the trail for other judges when he stated that
"(both one and) the other are writs of trespass.41" Fictions, too, played
their r6le here as' in other phases of the, development of the law. Dis-
seisin of chattels by election merely meant that the aggrieved party had
his choice of two remedies; and it was that choice which gave form
to the theory.4-  Men were rationalizing 'and shaping their beliefs to
:' One vital difference was that property in a stranger was no defense in trespass.
(1405) Y. B. 6 Hen. IV, z,7; (1442) Y. B. 2o Hen. VI, 18.8, apparently s.c.
Fitzherbert, Abridgment (1577) "Repl." 5; see (1469) Y. B. 9 Edw. IV, 41.25. Cf.
also (141.1) Y. B. 13 Hen. IV, 2.5.
In (1429) Y. B. 7 Hen. VI, 25.8, where there was an inquest at a habeas corpus
in replevin, counsel for the defendant challenged one of the jurors because he was
not a sufficient franktenant. The plaintiff 'contended that the writ of replevin was
in its nature a writ of trespass; that everything was "in the personalty"; and that
the juror was, therefore, qualified. But Cokayne, J., sustained the defendant:
"Replevin strikes all said in the realty, wherefore, Triers, see whether there be
sufficient franktenement; which they said yes." In (151o) Y. .B. 16 Hen. VII,
5.4, where the plaintiff brought replevin, the defendant said that the place where
the taking was made was called S. and not D. "And it was not allowed: for this
case is not similar to Trespass, wh~re the defendant is named of one vill, whereas
he is of another: but he will say well in Replevin that the taking is made in
another place, and not in the place in the writ, but he shall not plead [a] misnaming
of the place."
'Thus, the defendant might come by capias in replevin. "Why not?" asked
Chief Justice Bereford. "Is it not a writ of trespass?" (1310) Y. B. 3 & 4 Edw.
II (22 S. S.) 195. The tilt between the same judge and -counsel in (1312-3)
Y. B. 6 Edw. II (34 S. S.) 142 is a dramatic episode in this development. In
('343) Y. B. I7 & 18 Edw. III (R. S.) 212, 22o, where trespass was brought
against a bailiff and two sub-bailiffs for distress, Shardelowe, J., said: "You can
have any plea, as, for instance, Not Guilty; and so you can in Replevin, even
though the avowry may have been made by one for another. . . ." Cf. (1358)
Fitzherbert, op. c t. supra note 39, "Repl." 44. See (1490) Y. B. 5 Hen. VII,
18.i: "And so it is of [a] bailment of some sheep to pasture land, it is [a] good
plea in Trespass, or Replevin, as the case may be, inasmuch as he has property in
the form against the bailor himself : and inasmuch as this impediment is destroyed,
so that he has clear property against him, then he can take them. .. ." In (I5o6)
Y. B. 21 Hen. VII, 12.14, the defendant in replevin said that the place of the taking
was his franktenement and that he took the beasts damage feasant. The plaintiff
said that the avowry wa not good, "unless it is according to the order of a justifi-
cation in Trespass, for it is not the order in Avowry to suffer the franktenement
to come into dispute." But the court held the avowry good. For a further treat-
ment of the growing intimacy between trespass and replevin, see Bordwell, Property
it Chattgls (1916) 29 HARV. L. REv. 374, 388 ff.
Analogies were drawn also between trespass and rescous. Thus, where the
defendant pleaded outside of his fee in rescous, "the opinion of all the Court was,
that that was not [an] issue in this action, nor in [the] action; of trespass, but it
was proper to show of whom he held, and so outside of his fee, etc. And so he
did, etc." (1466) Y. B. 6 Edw. IV, 4.12.
4(1312-&.) Y. B. 6 Edw. II (34 S. S.) 142, 143.
'For an early expression of the theory, see (352) Lib. Ass. (27 Edw. III) 143.
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fit a predetermined result; there was no magical transformation.4 3  If
this mutuality was taking place rather slowly, that only indicated that
its need was not felt very sharply." It was not by leaps and bounds,
but by slow and often imperceptible steps; and the similarities between
the actions should not blind one to the fact of their different origins
and of the independent course followed by each. It was at a late day
that all doubts were set at rest.45 By 1770, it was possible to bring
trover for a wrongful distress.
46
This gradual concurrence between trespass and replevin was ren-
dered inevitable when the defendant in replevin asserted title to the
chattel in himself. That suh a plea was maintainable seems too
obvious for argument. As a defense, it was urged at quite an early
date47 and seems to have been freely asserted and its validity not
questioned after the middle of the fourteenth century'8 and even much
•64; and see (1358) Fitzherbert, op. cit. supra note 39, "Repl." 43; (i49o) Y. B. 6
Hen. VII, 7.4; (1498) Y. B. 14 Hen. VII, i2.z2. See, further, Bishop v.
Viscountess Montague (i6oi, C. P.) Cro. Eliz. 824; Powes v. Marshall (x665,
K. B.) i Sid. 172; cf. Russel v. Prat (i5go, Exch. Ch.) 4 Leon. 44; Bagshaw v.
Gaward (16o7, K. B.) Yelv. 96. Cf. Ames, op. cit. supra note IO, at p. 542.
"Professor Bordwell says that "disseisin by election was purely remedial. To
them it was the proceedings in trespass rather than the trespass itself that divested
the property, and the proceedings in trespass had this effect because they were for
damages alQne and therefore involved a wiaver of the right to the property itself."
Op. cit. supra note 40 at p. 385. This accurately represents the view of Vavisor, J.,
in (149o) Y. B. 6 Hen. VII, 74 (". . . . one can divest the property outside of
him .... by process of action of Trespass ...."). But Brian, C. J., urged that
property was "divested by the taking." The judges were really endeavoring to
justify a result by an all-satisfying theory. Well and truly might Justice Warber-
ton exclaim in Bishop and Jurdain v. Viscountess Montague (16o4, C. P.) Cro.
Jac. (4th ed. 1792) 5o: ".. . . for it cannot be, that he Ahould" have property, and
no property at one and the same time." He saw deeply enough into the form to
frown upon the theory; yet he did not see through it and failed to appreciate that
the wholesome results achieved by the law were more important than the probably'
questionable notions which had been weaved about them. See also Ames, op. cit.
supra note 10, at p. 553; 3 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 8, at p. 285; 18 Vin. Abr.
(2d ed. 1793) 577 (B) 2.
"Bordwell, op. cit. supra note 40, at p. 377.
'Mellor v. Leather (1853, Q. B.) i El. & Bl. *619 settled that replevin lay for
goods wrongfully taken, though not as distress. See also 3 Coke, First Institute
(2d Amer. ed. 1836) *336, note (B). For a discussion of the extension of the
action in Connecticut, see Connecticut Practice Book (1922) 194, note.
Tinkler v. Poole (K. B.) 5 Burr. 2657.
" (1304) Y. B. 32 & .33 )Edw. I (R. S.) 54; see Finkelstein, The Plea of
Property in a Stranger in Replevin (i923) 23 Cor,. L. Ryv. 652, 654, 655. Cf.
(1312) Y. B. 5 Edw. II (33 S. S.) 233 (trespass for distress, defense that property
in one of defendants). And see (1358) Fitzherbert, op. cit. supra, note 39,
"Repl." 43.
' (1363-4) Y. B. 38 Edw. III, 3.-(defendant asserted claim as execution
debtor) ; (1409) Y. B. ii Hen. IV, 10.21; see also (14o9) Y. B. ii Hen. IV, 2.4-
A plea in bar was the proper form of pleading by the defendant. (1453) Y.. B. 31
Hen. VT. r2.T; (534) Y. B. 26 Hen. VIII, 6.27; see also (1490) Y. B. 5 Hen.
VII. I8 iI.
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later,". though occasionally it could not defeat the plaintiff's action.5"
The plea is regularly found where replevin was brought for a taking
other than for distress.-' If deliverance had already been made to the
plaintiff, the defendant's assertion of a claim to the chattel would not
stop the suit in replevin.52 It was only when the assertion was made
before deliverance that the suit in replevin was halted and a situation
arose demanding a proceeding to determine the issue of property. The
defendant had now made himself liable in trespass or appeal of lar-
ceny. 3  Yet the advantages which replevin had were so desirable that
a device was necessary to enable one to utilize it and still dispose of
the defendant's plea. In meeting this need, the writ de proprietate
probanda performed a useful function. It directed that an inquest
"See Wildman v. Norton (1673, K. B.) i Vent. 249; Pesgrove v. Saunders
(1703, Q. B.) Holt, 562, sub. non. Presgrave v. Saunders, 2 Ld. Raym. 984, I
Salk. *5, Presgrove v. Saunders, 6 Mod..*81; Crosse v. Bilson (1704, Q. B.) 6
Mod. *1o2; Loveday v. Mitchell (1716, C. P.) Com. 247. See also 14 Petersdorff,
Abridgment (183o) 275; 2 Rolle, Abridgment (1668). 431 (H) 2 ff.; 18 Vin.
Abr. (2d ed. 1793) 582 (F I.) 4.
S. ... the property may be to the defendant, and yet the plaintiff may have
cause of replevin; as if he has let beasts to the plaintiff to compester his land for
certain time.. . ." I8 Vin. Abr. (2d ed. I793) 584 (F. 3) 2, note; (j46I) Y. B. i
Edw. IV, 9.18.
I' As where the defendant set up a "franchise" to all the wreckage of the sea in
hA vill. (330-I) Y. B. 5 Edw. III, 3.11, Fitzherbert, op. cit. supra note 39,
"lepl." 4r. Or to the chattels of felons within the hundred. (1333-4) Y. B. 8
-Edw. III, 1o.30 (not clear whether trespass or replevin). Cf. (I37) Y. B. 46
Edw. III, 13.16. See also (14o5) Y. B. 7 Hen. IV, 27.5; (I4O9) Y. B. ii Hen.
IV, 13.20 (not clear whether trespass or replevin).
'Ames, op. di. supra note 14, at p. 67. Indeed, a defendant was rebuked
for not permitting deliverance and then avowing properly in himself. "You talk
at random," exclaimed Chief Justice Bereford. "You ought to have suffered the
King's command [for the replevin of the beast] to be executed, and then, if by your
avowry you had attained your purpose, a return [of the beast] would have been
awarded to you." (1308-9) Y. B. i & 2 Edw. II (17 S'. S.) 65, 66. Cf. ig Vin.
Abr. (2d ed. 1793) 24 (C.a) i: "After avowry made by the defendant in replevin,
he cannot claim property."
'Ames, op. cit. supra note 14, at p. 67; see (1330-1) Y. B. 5 Edw. III, 3.11,
Fitzherbert, op. cit. supra note 39, "Repl." 41.
According to Ames, this writ was devised probably during the reign of Edward
III (1326-1377). Op. cit. supra note io, at p. 552. But Professor Bordwell has
shown that it had doubtless a much earlier origin. Op. cit. supra note 40, at pp.
376, 377. See also (313-4) Y. B. 6 & 7 Edw. II (29 S. S.) 197, 198: "Robert
was distrained by one Alexander and brought his replegiare. Alexander claimed
ownership and the Sheriff therefore could not make delivery; and so the writ
vel causam nobis significes was issued. The Sheriff made return that Alexander
asserted ownership, and a writ was therefore issued for an inquest as to the owner-
ship; and, if it should be found to be in Robert, the Sheriff was directed to make
deliverance to him. The Sheriff returned that the cattle were Robert's; [and
Mutford], for the plaintiff, counted in accordance with the writ."
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be held on the issue of propeity. A finding for the plaintiff would
merely revive the proceedings in replevin; it was not res adjudicata,
but a mere inquest of office, for the defendant might assert property
thereafter in court and have a final trial by jury.5  A finding for the
defendant, however, would end the suit in replevin.56
Knowledge that the defendant in replevin might assert a claim to the
chattel would, it seems, induce the plaintiff to take every precaution to
safeguard himself on the question of property. 'He might start forti-
fying his position by an allegation of ownership in himself. But was
the mere contingency of such an assertion by the defendant the sole
moving cause of careful pleading by the plaintiff? Or was it the
requirement that the plaintiff have a virtually impregnable property
interest in the chattel which made available to the defendant certain
strong defenses? The small amount of material bearing on this par-
ticular phase of the problem seems to indicate that the medieval law-
yers had the notion that an indisputable property interest in the chattel
was a condition precedent to the plaintiff's right of action in replevin.
There are numerous cases where the plaintiff did not omit to aver
property in himself although the defendant would not and did not join
issue thereon. The simplest averment was one where mere possessive
pronouns were used " . .. he has not denied that they were our
beasts . . . ", "You do not deny . . . . that on the day of the taldng
the beasts were ours. . ," "He has not denied that he took our
cattle . . . . "57 In the plain technical language of the day, it was cus-
tomary to denominate the goods and chattels as "the property" of the
sAmes, op. cit. supra note 14, at p. 68; i8 Vin. Abr. (2d ed. 1793) 583 (F. 2.) 2,
(F. 3.) 1 ; cf. Gilbert, op. cit. supra note 21, at p. 99. If it was finally found that
the plaintiff owned the chattels, the defendant was liable to additional penalties for
his false assertion. (1326) Fitzherbert, op. cit. supra note 39, "Repl." 26 (at
inquest); see (14o6) Y. B. 7 Hen. IV, 45.3; (i4o9) Y. B. ii Hen. IV, 4-io (fine
and ransom to the King and damages to the plaintiff, according to counsel);
Gilbert, op. cit. supra note 21, at p. oo.
' But the plaintiff might still bring trespass or appeal of larceny. Ames, op. cit.
supra note 14, at pp. 67, 68; cf. I8 Vin. Abr. (2d ed. 1793) 583 -(F. 2.) 1, note. Or
if he had brought replevin by plaint, he might now bring the same action by writ
and proceed as discussed in the text. (1356-7) Fitzherbert, op. cit. supra note 39,
"RepL" 35; Gilbert, op. cit. supra note 21, at p. 99. See (461) Y. B. i Edw. IV,
9.8, Fitzherbert, op. cit. supra note 39, "RepI." 12; * cf. (1534) Y. B. 26 Hen.
VIII, -6.27. .Cf. also (1355) Fitzherbert, op. cit. supra note 39, "Repl." 36. See
also i Fitzherbert, op. cit. supra note i6, at p. 77 C, note (a).
A servant could not assert property in his master. (i4o9) Y. B. ii Hen- IV,
4 10; 18 Viner, op. cit. supra note 43, at p. 582 (F. 1.) 3. One not a party to the
writ of replevin could not have de proprietate probanda. (413) Y. B. 14 Hen. IV,
24.32; 2 Rolle, op. cit. supra note 21 at p.. 431 (F) i; i8 Vin. Abr. (2d ed. 1793)
582 (F. i.) 1, 2.
" (1339) Y. B. 12 & 13 Edw. III (R. S.) 228, 230. 234, note. And see (r342)
Y. B. 16 Edw. III (II R. S.) 440, 442 (". 1 • • I will aver that it was my
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plaintiff58 or of the plaintiffs as owners in common.59 Indeed, the par-
ties often joined issue on the question as to whether the plaintiff was
the owner or not, the defendant taking great pains to deny the plain-
tiff's title.60 It was going a little further to strengthen that denial by
the affirmative defense that a third person owned the goods.6 And
yet the roots of the doctrine of ius tertii may lie still deeper.62
The defense of property in a third person calls one's attention to cer-
tain requirements of pleading exacted from the plaintiff which so clearly
suggest the doctrine that they should not be overlooked Thus, owners
of goods in severalty could not join in replevin.613  Nor could such
actions be joined by suit brought in the name of one owner only.64 The
naked defense of hus tertii may in all probability have meant that such
a stringent requirement was being carried a step further. However
that may be, it had begun to be freely asserted by I3045 and it con-
' The notes from the records appended to cases published by the Selden Society
fully bear this out: (I311) Y. B. 5 Edw. II (31 S. S.) 6, 13; (1311) Y. B. s Edw.
II (31 S. S.) 18-2o; (1311) Y. B. 5 Edw. II (31 S. S.) 84, 89, 95; (1I1) Y. B.5 Edw. II (31 S. S.) 96, 98, 99; (1311) Y. B. s Edw. II (31 S- S.) 119, 120;
(1312) Y. B. 5 Edw. II (33 S. S.) 63, 64; (1312) Y. B. 5 Edw. II(33 S. S.) 64, 68; (1312) 5 Edw. II (33 S. S.) 141, 143, 144; (1313)
Y. B. 6 & 7 Edw. II (36 S. S.) 4, 13; (1313) Y. B. 6 & 7 Edw. II(36 S. S.) 11o, 116, 117; (1313) Y. B. 6 & 7 Edw. II (36 S. S.) 143, 148; (1313)
Y. B. 6 & 7 Edw. II (36 S. S.) 185, 188; (1313) Y. B. 6 & 7 Edw. II (36 S. S.)
218, 223; (1313) Y. B. 6 &7 Edw. 11 (36 S. S.) 236, 237; (1314) Y. B. 7 Edw.
II (39 S. S.) 80, 81; (1314) Y. B. 7 Edw. II (39 S. S.) .15, ii8; (1314) Y. B.7 Edw. II (39 S. S.) 136, 138; (1314) Y. B. 7 Edw. II (39 S. S.) 151, 152;(1314) Y. B. 7 Edw. II (39 S. S.) 155; (1314) Y. B. 7 Edw. II (39 S. SO.) 162,169; (1314) Y. B. 7 Edw. II (39 S. S.) I8, 199; (1314) Y. B. 7 Edw. II(39 S. S.) 213-215; (1314) Y. B. 8 Edw. II (37 S. S.) 18, 22; (1314) Y. B. 8
Edw. II (37 S. S.) 87, 88; (1314) Y. B. 8 Edw. II (37 S. S.) 114, 118. 119;(1314) Y. B. 8 Edw. II (37 S. S.) 120, 129; (1314) Y. B. 8 Edw. II (37 S. S.)
197, 199.
(310) Y. B. 3 & 4 Edw. II (22 S. S.) 198.
(I3s) Y. B. 30 Edw. III, 9.-; cf. (349) Y.'B. 24 Edw. III, 35.38.
"t See, e. g., (146o) Y. B. 39 Hen. VI, 35-47; (1481) Y. B. 21 Edw. IV, 54.24.
The fact that the defendant first asserted property in a stranger and then denied
property in the plaintiff seems immaterial.
"Cf. infra note 78 ff. The souhdness of the rule is not questioned when the
defendant links himself in interest with the stranger, e. g., makes conusance as his
bailiff. See (I293) Y. B. 21 & 22 Edw. I (R. S.) 154; (414) Y. B. 2 Hen. V,
1.1; (1457) Y. B. 35 Hen. VI, 47.12..
" (1353) Y B. 28 Edw. III, 16.14, apparently s. c. Fitzherbert, op. cit. supra
note 39, "Repl." 40; 3 Coke, op. cit. supra note 45, at p. *338, note (D) ; Coke,
Littleton, 145b; see (1433) Y. B. ii Hen. VI, 31.17; cf. (1456) Y. B. 34 Hen.
VI, 37.8, Fitzherbert, op. cit. supra note 39, "Repl." Io. See also (1308-9) Y. B.
I & 2 Edw. II (17 S. S.) 128, Fitzherbert, op. cit. supra note 39, "Repl." 42.
"And so -in a replevyn it is a good plea to say, that the property is to the
plaintife and to a stranger." Coke, Littleton, 145b; Gilbert, op. cit. supra note 21,
at p. 128 (plea in abatement).
"Y. B. 32 &33 Edw. I (R. S.) 82.
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tinued to. crop up during the next two centuries. 66 But if any hard-
ship devolved upon the plaintiff by reason of this defense, there was
a slight concession made to him in enlarging the class of property inter-
ests that "would support replevin. There are frequent references to
"general property" and "special property." 7 Not a few cases of
replevin are found where the defendant pleaded property in a stranger
and was met by the replication that the plaintiff had such a "special
property" in the chattels that the defendant's plea was of ho avail.
Such an interest the plaintiff had with respect to beasts of a third per-
son compestering s and manuring his land;691 agisting;7° couchant and
levant.71 Certain classes of persons had a special property interest in
the chattels of certain classes of "strangers": a lord in the go6ds of his
villein ;72 a husband in the goods of his wife distrained before -cover-
" (306) Y. B. 33-35 Edw. I (R. S.) 148 (though denial of plaintiff's title, no
statement that in third person); (1313-4) Y. B. 6 & 7 Edw. II (29 S. S.) x94
(admission by plaintiff that property in certain stranger); (1358) Fitzherbert,
op. cit. supra note 39, "Repl." 44; (1405) Y. B. 6 Hen. IV, 2.17; (x424) Y. B. 2
Hen. VI, I4-o, Fitzherbert, op. cit. supra note 39, "Rep." i; (7430) Y. B. 9
Hen. VI, 39.14; (7442) Y. B. 20 Hen. VI, 18.8; (1462) Y. B. 2 Edw.'IV, 922;
see (7410) Y. B. 77 Hen. IV, 90.47.
'"But there be two kinde of properties; a generall propertie, which every
absolute owner hath; and a speciall propertie, as goods pledged or taken to manure
his lands, or the like; and of both these a replegiare doth lye." Coke, Littleton,
145b.
2 Rolle, Abridgment (I668) 430 (C) 2.
(303) Y. B. 30 & 3r Edw. I (R. S.) 42; (1327) Y. B. 2 Edw. III, 17.19;
(1409) Y. B. ii Hen. IV, 17.39. The reason given is that the plaintiff was answer-
able for them to the owner. See also 2 Rolle, Abridgment (i668) 430 (C) i.
' (1328) Y. B. 3 Edw. III, 29.36 (damage feasant). See also 2 Rolle, Abridg-
ment (1668) 43o (C) i.
' See (1367) Y. B. 42 Edw. i1, 18.32, Fitzherbert, op. cit. supra note 39,
"RepI." 30 (also manuring and agisting). See also 2 Rolle Abridgment (f668)
43o (C) i. So could a bailee at will maintain replevin since he was answtrable to
his bailor. (5o6) Y. B. 21 Hen. VII, 1.23; cf. (1313-4) Y. B. 6 & 7 Edw. II
(29 S. S.) 194.
" (1344-5) Y. B. i8 & i9 Edw. nI (R. S.) soo, Fitzherbert, op. cit. supra note
39, "Repl." 3z In this case Kelshulle, J., asked: "Cannot a- villein sell his horse
or his cow without his lord having an action?" Willoughby, J., answered in the
affirmative, adding: "but when the villein's beasts are taken the lord can replevy
them by law." At p. 5o2. See (367) Y. B. 42 Edw. I1, 18.32, Fitzherbert,
op. cit. supra note 39, "Rep1. ' 30. In Coke, Littleton, 145b, the reason given is
that "the bringing of the replevy amounts to a clayme in law, and vests the
property in the plaintife. But in that case if the goods of the villeine be taken by
a trespasse, the lord shall have no replevy; because the villeine had but a right"
And so under a variety of cih-cmstances. "If [a] man take the cattle of my
tenant, and I take out of the pound his cattle and put in my cattle in pledge for
them, I can maintain a replevin for my cattle, and the other shall not avoid that
by saying that he took the cattle of my tenant," 2 Rolle, Abridgment (1668) 43o
(B) x., citing (4o6) Y. B. 7 Hen. IV, i8.2o, in which the court also conceded:
.... and the same remedy can the tenant have when the Lord distrains for the
services [due to] the mesne next to the tenant, the Lord can put his beasts for him,
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ture ;73 an executor in the. goods of his testator taken during the latter's
lifetime.74 But even if the defendant's plea of ius tertii was sustained
in these various instances, he could not have return of the chattels unless
he set forth with some particularity why he took them.75 The Eng-
lish courts have conceded the doctrine to be sound.7 6 But in the United
States, the courts are in conflict.Y A recent case repudiating the ortho-
dox English rule is Hart v. irove (1923) 92 Okla. 203, 218 Pac. 855.
Many attempts have been made to discover the reasons for the rule
or formulate a rational theory. At least three hypotheses have been
advanced: (i) the plea was good because the defendant distrained for
a demand he had against the stranger;781 (2) j the roundabout method
and thus saves each estate, for the tenant has no other remedy, inasmuch as he is
[a] stranger to the avowry, and if the mesne refuse to aid his tenant by the manor,
the tenant shall have writ of Mesie on his special matter." "But it seemeth he
shall not have damages for the taking of the cattle, but only for the detaining of
them, if the same be found for him." i Fitzherbert, op. cit. supra note 16 at p.
69 F.
(1358) Fitzherbert, op. cit. supra note 39, -"RepL" 43. In fact, the husband
alone could bring replevin. 1 Fitzherbert, op. tit. supra note I6, at p. 69 K.
It . but if the feine holds them merely in autre droit, the action should bebrought in their joint names." 14 Petersdorff, op. cr. supra note 49 at p. 253, note.
74 14 Petersdorff, op. cit. supra note 49, at p. 253, note; 3 Coke, op. cit. supra
note 45, at p. *338, note (D).
19 Vin. Abr. (2d ed. I793) 25 (C. a) 4, 26. But Thomas Littleton, J., con-
tended for a contrary rule in (146o) Y. B. 39 Hen. VI, 35-47.
"Salkll v. Shelton (i6i9, K. B.) 2 Rolle, 64, sub nom. Salkold v. S kelto,
Cro. Jac. 519; Wildman v. North (1673, K. B.) 2 Lev. *92; Butcher v. Porter
(1692, I. B.) Carth. 243, I Show. *4oo, (1693) 1 Salk. *94; Parker v. Mellor
(1697, K. B.) Carth. 398, I I. Raym. 217, sub norm. Parker v. Meller (i698)
12 Mod. *122; Barrett v. Scrimshaw (i698, K. B.)'Comb. 477; see Crosse v. Bilson,
supra note 49, at p. *io3; Templeman v. Case (711, Q. B.) l0 Mod. *24, *25;
.... a possessory right is sufficient to maintain an action of trespass or case.
though not a replezin ... " And see (i92o) 2o CoL. L. Rav. 622. The few
attacks upon the doctrine have borne no fruit. In (1481) Y. B. 21 Edw. IV, 54.24,
counsel urged: "It is proper for you to say without that T. A. was possessed of
them, for [a] man can have Replevin notwithstanding that he has no property."
See also (1405) Y. B. 7 Hen. IV, 27.5 (similar unsuccessful attempt, probably by
judge). The only point in controversy seemed to be whether the defendant should
plead in bar or in abatement. For a discussion of modern phases of pleading in
replevin, see (1921) 5 MINN. . Rvv. 563.
" See (1920) 20 COL. L. Riv. 622. Curiously, the old doctrine has been
preserved or adopted by statute. See Conn. Gen.. Sts., 1918, sec. 61oE;
N. Y. C. P. A., 7920, sec. 7093. For limitations on the application of the New
York statute, see (i92o) 2o COL. L. Rnv. 622; see also Finkelstein, op. cit. supra
note 47 at p. 657.
' Finkelstein, op. cit. sup-ra note 47, at pp. 653, 654. This is certainly true in
many cases. See supra notes 68-74. But even where the defendant's demand was
against a third party, the plea had no operative effect in view of the plaintiff's
special property interest. There is evidence that the plea was in full vigor when
the defendant's demand was solely against the plaintiff. At least, some cases do
not show that the defendant's demand was against the third person. See cases cited
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of pleading so confused the medieval judges that the rule was
inevitable; 79 ° (3) the doctrine would clearly follow in an action
so restricted in scope as replevin.8 0 The Year Books give noth-
ing definite on this important point, though occasionally there is
a faint clue. In a case decided in I46O,s1 Chief justice Prisot argued
that since the defendant had "prior possession", and property in the
plaintiff had been disproved, the former should have return of the
chattels.8 2  His statement suggests some interesting queries: Did the
defendant's "prior possession" give substance and life to the plea of
ius tertii? What did Chief Justice Prisot mean by "prior possession" ?88
Strange as the plea may strike a modern lawyer, -it is clear that the
early judges were wide awake to its existence in replevin and fully
conscious of its absence in trespass.8 4 In differentiating the two actions
on this basis, some judges or lawyers might be expected to let slip a
fairly satisfactory, though not wholly convincing, reason. In a case
decided in 1405,85 Justice Hankford thus drew the distinction: "It is
[a] good plea in Replevin, because to the common intent the taking is
lawful, and therefore there is no need to excuse himself of any tort, but
in trespass it will not be considered lawful to any intent, etc."8 6  And
in 1469,87 Justice Laken said that in replevin "the plaintiff has no cause
of action if the beasts are not his."88  Justice Hankford's view seems
supra note 66, except, possibly, (1314-4) Y. B. 6 & 7 Edw. II (29 S. S.) I94.
Cf. also supra note 76. Besides, one was privileged to distrain any person's
beasts found upon the land from which the services issued or where damage was
committed. This was well expressed by Catesby, counsel, in (i474) Y. B. 13 Edw.
IV, 6.2: "..... if there are Lord and tenant, and the beast of a stranger is taken
by the Lord, and he brings Replevin against the Lord, who avows on his tenant,
the stranger shall not have the plea in that case, but is without remedy, etc."
"That is, stating that property was in a stranger and adding: "absque hoc that
it is in the plaintiff." Cook and Hinton, Cas-es on Pleading at Common Law
(1923) 9o, note 8. But such a method of pleading is not always found where the
defense is ius tertii. So far as property in a stranger is concerned, the expression,
"sans que," seems to have been first used in (I4O5) Y. B. 6 Hen. IV, 2.17. Before,
there had been some faint approaches to the phrase. (328) Y. B. 3 Edw. III,
1133 (". ... Russell dist, que ilz sont les avers J. de E. et nient ses avers.... .") ;
(344-5) I8 & i9 Edw. III (R. S.) 500, 502 ("The beasts are theirs and not
yours .... Y).
,o (ig2o) 2o COL. L. Rav. 622. Cf. infra note 93.
Y. B. 39 Hen. VI; 35-47.
' His position was not in accordance with the prevailing views of other judges
and lawyers. See supra note 75.
Cf. supra note ii.
"See supra note 39.
"Y. B. 6 Hen. IV, 2.17.
S"I1 est bon ple en Replevin, pur ceo que al common entent le prisel est loyal,
et issint ne besoigne'de luy excuser del tort, Imes en trespas ne serra entendue loyal
a nul entent, etc."
"Y. B. 9 Edw. IV, 41.25.
".... le plaintiff n'ad cause d'action si les blasts ne soient les souns .. " A
dictum at most.
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thoroughly groinded on the theories which underlay distress and
replevin.89  Since the distrainor neither purported to commit a tort in
seizing the chattels nor asserted a right to them afterwards, he could pre-
serve his immunity by the plea of ius tertii if the justice of his alleged
claim or the propriety of his conduct was questioned. But was this
defense always available? If deliverance had been made to the plain-
tiff, the defendant, if he wanted his custody restored, would have had
to set up specifically why he took the goods.90 justice Laken's expres-
sion supports the inference already drawn that property in the plaintiff
as a prerequisite to the maintenance of the action gave rise to the
defensef 1 But even this would not mean that merely because a
stranger owned the goods, the former distrainor should be given their
custody regardless of whether he really had a claim against the dis-
trainee. 2 Distress and replevin were mutual offsets 3 or checks and
balances in the law of feudal times. 4  Possibly the condition of title
imposed upon the tenant was *one of the advantages which that law
allowed the lord.
VENDEE'S CLAIM TO INSURANCE MONEY RECEIVED BY VENDOR
In Brownell v. Board of Education (1924, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 123
-Misc. 64, 2o4 N. Y. Supp. 15o, a New York court was called upon.
for the first time to pass upon the difficult question raised in the lead-
mng case of Rayner v. Preston.1 In the latter case a vendor of certain
realty had received the money payable under an insurance policy pre-
viously procured on the buildings sold, which had been damaged by fire
after the execution of the contract but before conveyance to the vendee.
After the vendee had paid the purchase money, as he was legally bound
to do, he filed his bill to compel the vendor to pay over the insurance
money, or to apply it to the repair of the damaged building. A major-
ity of the English Court of Appeal, affirming the judgment of Jessel,
M. R.,2 held that the vendee had no claim whatever to the fund, which,
in a later proceeding, the vendor was compelled to return to the insurer.3
Cf. supra note 9.
"Supra note 75.
SSee spra note 57 and text preceding. Cf. supra note 8o.
Justice Hankford's remarks about trespass might simply mean that in that
case, the defendant was guilty of a tort against the plaintiff.
"Cf. Cobbey, Replevin (2d ed. 19oo) sec. I; 2 Kocourek and Wigmore, op. cit.
sipra note 6 at p. 6o2.
" Cf. 3 Blackstone, op. cit. supra note ii at p. 13.14: .... as a distress is at
common law only in nature of a security for the rent or damages done, -a replevin
answers the same end to the distrainor as the distress itself ; since the party
replevying gives security to return the distress, if the right be determined against
him"
(I88r, C. A.) L. R. I8 Ch. Div. i.2 In (i8o) L. P- 14 Ch. Div. 297.
'See Castellain v. Preston (1883, C. A.) L. R. ii Q. B. Div. 380.
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This decision rested on the doctrine that the insurance policy was a per-
sonal contract between the vendor and the underwriter to which the ven-
dee was not a party, and that it did not run, even in equity, to the vendee
with the land of which he became in equity the owner. James, L. J.,
dissented strongly on the ground that the plaintiff's contention was
"founded not only on what I may call the natural equity which com-
mends itself to the general sense of the lay world not instructed in legal
principles, but also on artificial equity as it is understood and admin-
istered in our system of jurisprudence." As to the lay sense of equity
he was undoubtedly right but he had more difficulty in establishing the
vendee's "artificial equity." This he found in the principle that the
vendor holds the legal title for the benefit of the vendee, and likewise
any profits or advantages that may accrue by reason of such. legal
ownership, including the insurance money here received.' But to this
argument Brett, L. J., writing for the majority of the court, made a
crushing reply: "But that is not the law. The contract of insurance
does not run with the land; it is a mere personal contract, and unless
it is assigned no suit or action can be maintained upon it except between
the parties to it." In the Brownell case, however, the Supreme Court,
sitting in Saratoga County, seemed to find no difficulty in accepting the
reasoning of Lord Justice James. After quoting with approval the
statement of the Connecticut Court in Williams v. Lilley,5 that "while the
money received for insurance was unexpended and .unpledged for
repairs in the hands of the defendants, the plaintiff would have been
entitled to receive such money as part and parcel of the property, which
it would have been the duty of the defendants to convey to him",
Angell, J., said :6 "The conclusion seems inevitable, from both reason
and authority, that, as defendant after the execution of the contract was
trustee of the property-both the land and the buildings-for plaintiff,
when the fire occurred the situation was not changed; defendant con-
tinued to hold the property including the insurance -money in place of
the building destroyed in the same trust capacity."
While Rayner v. Preston has been followed by the English courts,7
and in a few American decisions,8 yet the result arrived at has caused
""But I prefer to rest my judgment on the fact that the relation between the
vendor and the purchaser became, and was in law, as from the date of the
contract and up to the completion of it, the relation of trustee and cestui que trust,
and that the trustee received the insurance money by reason of and as the actual
amount of the damage done to the trust property." James, UJ., in Rayner v.
Pi'eston, supra, at p. i6.
'(1895) 67 Conn. 50, 62, 34 Att. 765, 769. This statement, tantamount to a
declaration that under such circumstances the insurance contract runs with the
land, is mere dictum, as here the vendee was under a duty to pay the insurance
premiums, and so clearly entitled to the benefit of the insurance.
2o4 N. Y. Supp. at p. 154, 123 Misc. at p. 68.
SSee West of England Fire Ins. Co. v. Isaacs [1897, C. A.] i Q. B.. 226;
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Spooner [1905] 2 K. B. 753.
8 King v Preston (1856) i1 La. Ann. 95; Kortlander v. Elston (1892, C. C. A.
6th) 52 Fed. i8o (personal property). To the same effect is White v. Gilnan
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widespread dissatisfaction, as evidenced by the statement quoted from
the BrownelO case and by numerous American decisions which either
decide'1 or vigorously assert" that under such circumstances te loss
should fall upon the insurer who was paid to bear it, and not upon the
vendee, who, had he but thought of *it, could easily have procured the
assignment of the policy. That the same dissatisfaction existed in
England is apparent from the enactment in 1922 of a statute changing
the rule.'2
(19o3) 138 Calif. 375, 71 Pac. 436, in which, however, the policy had been taken
out by the vendor after the sale, and without any reference to the vendee's
interest. In Plimpton v. Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (1871) 43 Vt 497, the
purchaser at execution sale was denied any interest in the insurance procured
by the judgment debtor.
*This statement was, perhaps, not strictly necessary to the decision of the case.
The vendor had contracted to deliver possession. of the premises "in as good
condition as they now are." A liberal construction of this provision might find
in it a covenant to keep the premises insured for the benefit of the vendee, but
the court, in giving the vendee. the benefit of the insurance money, based its
judgment on broader grounds, as shown in the statement quoted.
"In Kaufman V'. All Persons (1911) 16 Calif. App. 388, I17, Pac. 586, the
vendee had assumed paymnt of a mortgage debt which was further secured by
an insurance policy procured by the vendor, but payable to the mortgagee. A
loss having occurred after the sale, it was held that the vendee was entitled to
have the insurance money paid to the mortgagee credited on the purchase price.
Skinner & Sons Dry Dock Co. v. Houghton (19oo) 92 Md. 68, 48 Atl. 85.
Here the court held that the contract of sale was such an alienation as to dis-
charge the insu:ers under the. policies as written, but that the insured vendor
should hold the money actually paid by one insurer and that which others had
declared a willingness to pay, in trust for the vendee. Lord Justice James'
trust theory was expressly accepted and applied. Reed v. Lukens (1863) 44 Pa.
200, involved an assignment after loss by the vendor to the vendee, but the
court squarely decided that the vendor held the insurance money in trust for
the vendee, and that this trust relationship was not negatived by the assignment.
In Russell v. Elliott (1922) 45 S. D. 184, 186 N. W. 824, the vendee was
given the benefit of the insurance under facts not to be distinguished from those
in Rayner v. Preston, supra note i. In Mattingly v. Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co.
(904) I2O Ky. 768, 83 S. W. 577, after sale and conveyance of the insured
property, the agent of the insurer orally agreed that the vendor's policy should
remain in effect "as collateral security" for the unpaid purchase money. It was
.held that the vendor must credit the insurance money received under this policy
upon the vendee's unpaid notes. It is difficult .to reconcile this decision with the
settled rule that the mortgagor takes no benefit whatever from insurance pro-
cured independently by the mortgagee.
The American courts appear unwilling to apply this doctrine for the relief
of one who has only an option at the time of the loss, and thereafter exercises his
option. See Strong v. Moore (1922) 105 Or. 12, 207 Pac. 179.
"See Williams v. Lilley, supra note 5; Milleville Aerie etc. v. Weatherby (1913)
82 N. J. Eq. 455, 88 Atl. 847; Gates v. Smith (1846, N. Y.) 4 Edw. Ch. 702;
Gilbert v. Port (1876) 28 Ohio St 276; Peoples Street Ry. Co. v. Spencer (1893)
16 Pa. 85, 27 AtI. 113; Pound, Progress of the Law (1920) 33 HARv. L. REv.'
813, 828, 829; (1922) 6 MINN. L. REv. 6o7.
"(1922) 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 6, sec. 1O5. "Any money becoming payable after the
date of any contract for sale of property under any policy of assurance in respect of
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Where the risk of loss remains on the vendor under an executory
-contract, as it does in some jurisdictions, he is justly enough allowed
to retain the insurance money.1 s
The general dissatisfaction, with the rule in Rayner v. Preston indi-
cates that the court did not give to the contract the meaning which it has
for the persons who ordinarily make such contracts. Lord Justice James
remarked incidentally in his dissenting opinion:14 "I believe it [the
fire policy] to be considered by the universal consensus of mankind, to
be a policy for the benefit of all persons interested in the property.".
Here we have suggested, but unfortunately not developed or pressed,
the real error in the Court's reasoning. If the contract of sale had
assigned to the vendee the benefit of the insurance pending its com-
pletion,15 or if it imposed upon the vendee the duty of paying the
premium charge for that period,1 6 or otherwise provided that as
between vendor and vendee, the latter should have benefit of the ven-
dor's policy, such agreement would have been given effect, even though
not assented to or known, by the insurer.'7  It is reasonable to infer
that the business public assumes that an executory contract for the sale
of insured realty carries the protection of existing insurance policies
to. the vendee even though it makes no mention of the insurance, that
is, that in such cases the insurance runs with the land.18 If that is
the meaning of the transaction in the market place, that should also be
any damage to or destruction of property included in such contract shall, on
completion of such contract, bui subject to any stipulation to the contrary, be
held or receivable by the vendor on behalf of the purchaser and paid by the
vendor to the purchaser on completion of the sale or so soon thereafter as the
same shall be received by the vendor."
'Phinizy v. Guernsey (1900) III Ga. 346, 36 S. E. 796.
"
4Rayner v. Preston, supra note i, at p. I5.
' See Rayner v. Preston,supra note i, per Brett, L. J. at p. 1o; Zenor v. Hayes
(19o7) 228 Ill. 626, 81 N. E. 1144; Reed v. Lukens, supra note 1o; ShotzOell v.
Jefferson Ins. Co. (1859, N. Y. Super. Ct) 5 Bosw. 247; Allyn v. Allyn (18g')
154 Mass. 57o, 28 N. E. 779; Fanning v. Equitable F. & M. Ins. Co. (i8gi) 46 Ill.
App. 215. See also King v. Preston, supra note 8; Naquin v. Texas Savings etc.
Asioc. (1902) 95 Tex. 313, 67 S, W. 85.
"1 Williams v. Lilley, supra note 5; Brakhage v. Tracy (x9oo) 13 S. D. 343,
83 N. W. 363. But see Wright v. Continental Ins. Co. (1903) 117 Ga. 499, 43
S. E. 7oo, where the court states that a vendee, though bound to pay the premiums,
has no interest. in a policy issued to the vendor after the sale.
"'In Doty v. Rensselaer Fire Ins. Co. (I919, 3d Dept.) 188 App.. Div. 29,
176 N. Y. Supp. 55, a husband, by way of separation settlement, orally gave his
wife certain realty for life, promising to keep the building thereon insured for
her benefit. The wife having gone into possession and made improvements, the.
husband insured the building in his own name. After the burning of the building,
the husband collected the insurance money, refusing to make repairs or provide
the wife another home. It was held that under such facts the wife was entitled
to the insurance money. See the comment of Dean Pound'on this case in Progress
of the Law, op. cit. supra note ii, at p. 828. See also Insurance Co. v. Updegraff
(1853) 2I Pa. 513, and Brozrnell v. Board of Education, supra note 6.
1 See Insurance, Co. v. Updegraff, supra note 17, where a vendor insured the
realty sold, but only partially paid for, in his own name, and himself paid the
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its meaning in the court room. In any event such is the meaning which
the English Parliament and many of the American cou-ts have given
it. Here we have an instance in which business usage stibstitutes the
insurance money for the insured property, despite the general rule
that the two are not legally connected; and, as usual, the courts are
sluggishly following business."
There is little evidence, however, of any tendency to" extend this
dodrine of substituting the insurance money for the insured property
to cases in which the vendee independently procures insurance upon
the property sold. Here the contract of insurance is held to be purely
a personal arrangement between the vendee and the insurer, and the
vendee takes the insurance money free from any liens which the vendor
may have against the insured property.20 The vendor has no equity
either in the court room or the market place. But when the vendee pro-
cures insurance payable to the vendor as his interest may appear, or
has contracted to do so, the vendor is, of course, entitled to the insur-
ance to the extent of the unpaid purchase money.21
W. R. V.
IMPOSSIBILITY AND THE DOCTRINE OF FRUSTRATION OF THE
COMMERCIAL OBJECT
It is commonly said that courts in the interpretation of contracts
endeavor oily to find the intention of the parties.' But their .private
intention is not satisfactory as an ultimate test of liability since it must
be ineffective unless expressed in some way. It is "the expression .and
premium, the court thought it clear that all the parties intended the insurance
to cover the vendee's interest as well as the insuring vendor's, since the premium
charge was adequate for such coverage. Hence the vendor was allowed to
recover the full amount of the policy, holding the excess above the purchase
money unpaid in trust for the vendee.
'In Doty v. Rensselaer County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., supra note 17, at p. 32,
this process is strikingly illustrated when the court, without citation of authority
or other signs of distress, in a matter-of-fact way, remarks: "The insurance
money takes the place of the house. Whatever interest in the house the plaintiff
had, a corresponding interest attaches to the insurance, which is a substitute for the
house."
"Zenor v. Hayes, supra note 15; Hammer v. Johnson (1867) 44 IIl. 292;
Whitehouse v. Cargill (1896) 88 Me. 479, 34 Atl. 276; McCutcheon v. Ingraham
(889) 32 W. Va. 378, 9 S. E. 26o. But see Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Mitchell (1873)
67 Ill. 43, in which the vendor who succeeded in having a conveyance set aside
for fraud, was held entitled to the benefit of insurance procured by the fraudulent
vendee when a loss occurred preceding the litigation. See 13 L. R. A. (N. s.)
9o9, note.
' Grange Mill Co. v. Western Assur. Co. (1886) 118 II1. 396, N. E. 274.
'Arlington Hotel v. Rector (ig6) 124 Ark. go, 186 S. W. 622; President
Suspender Co. v. McWilliam (1gi6, C. C. A. 2d) 238 Fed. I59; Manson v.
Curtis (1gi8) 223 N. Y. 313, 1ig N. E. 559; International Signal Co. v. Marconi
Wireless Telegraph Co. (ig8) 89 N. J. Eq. 319, io4 Ati. 378.
4
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not the intention that is given legal operation.2  On the other hand the
liability of the parties may depend upon the court's reaction to unex-
pressed and unanticipated circumstances.3 Since no form of words is
likely to cover automatically all contingencies, the courts resort to
so-called "implied conditions" to enlarge and even to contradict5
express terms of the contract. This theory of construction has its
foundation in the courts' conception of what the parties would have
intended had they foreseen these contingencies, a conception influenced
by the prevailing mores of the community.8  But the difficulty of ascer-
taining this intention and the latitude of judicial discretion are mani-
fested by the uncertainty in the results reached by the courts. In no
place in the history of contract law has this uncertainty been more con-
spicuous than in the disintegration of the doctrine of impossibility. As
early as I555 there had been in English law dicta to the effect that
performance was excused by the death of the party who alone was to
perform the thing that was to be done.7 But we find little else on the
subject of impossibility until the dictum in Paradine v. Jane.8 Through-
out the decisions9 until the middle of the nineteenth century runs the plain
reasoning of that case that "When a party by his own contract creates
a duty or charge upon himself he is bound to make it good, if he may,
notvithstanding ;ny accident by inevitable necessity because he might
2Smith v Abington Savings Bank (1898) I7I Mass. 178, so N. E. 545; 2
Williston Contracts (292o) sec. 6Io; Justice Holmes in Goode v. Riley (1891)
153 Mass. 585, 28 N. E. 228: "You cannot prove a mere private convention
between the parties to give language a different meaning from its common one.
It would open too great risks if evidence were admissible to 8how that when
they said five hundred feet they agreed it should mean one hundred inches or
that Bunker Hill monument should signify the old South Church."
'Holmes, The Path of the Law (1897) io HARV. L. RaV. 457, 466; Corbin,
Conditions in the Law of Contracts (I919) 28 YALE LAw Jo URNAL, 739, 74o.
"Bank Line v. Capel [1919, H. L.] A. C. 435; North German Lloyd v. Guaranty
Trust Co. (1917) 244 U. S. 12, 37 Sup. Ct. 490; Mineral Park Land Ca. v.
Howard (1916) 172 Calif. 289, 156 Pac. 458; Fellows v. Fairbanks (1923, 4 th
Dept) 205 App. Div. 271, 199 N. Y. Supp. 772.
-Nolan v. Whitney (1882) 88 N. Y. 648; Metropolitan Water Board v. Dick,
Kerr & Co. [x18, H. L.] A. C. i1g; Naylor v. Krainische Industrie Gesell-
schaft [1918] i K. B. 331.
* (1907) 7 Co.. L. Rav. 163; Bank Line v. Capel, supra note 4; Leonard v. Dyer
(1857) 26 Conn. 172.
72 Dyer (1555-6) *Ii4a. A contract for personal- service is discharged by
the arrest or imprisonment of the one who is to perform such services. Melville
v. DeWolfe (1855, Q: B.) 4 El. & BI. 844; Hughes v. Wamsutta Mills (1865,
Mass.) ii Allen, 2Ol, Page, Impossibility of Performance (192o) 18 Mica.
L REv. 589, -593. Where performance has become unreasonably dangerous to
life no action will lie for non-performance. Lakeman v. Pollard (1857) 43 Me.
463; 1 Rolle, Abridgment (1668) 450 (G) io; cf. Hall v. Wright (1858, Q. B.)
EL. B1. & El. 746.
' (1647, K. B.) Aleyn, 26.
'Rolle, op. cit. supra note 7, at p. 449 (G) a; Walton v. Waterhouse (672,
K B.) 2 Wins. Saunders, 42ia; Hall v. Wright, supra note 7-
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have provided against it by his contract." Taylor v. Caldwell evidences
the first change in that strict doctrine.'0 There a music haUl which had
been let to the plaintiff by the defendant was destroyed by fire before
the plaintiff went into possession:.- Since performance by the lessor
was impossible, it was held, that both parties were excused from per-
formance on the ground that their rights and duties were subject to an
"implied condition" that the subject matter would continue -to exist.
Apparently the court was expressing its idea of justice by an extension
of the rule terminating liability where death precluded performance,
but it obscured its mental processes by the introduction of an implied
condition when the probability is that the parties never contemplated
breach or had this particular contingency in mind.
The expansive nature of the rule in Taylor v. Caldwell became appar-
ent in the series of decisions known as the "Coronation Cases,"" the
leading case being Krell v. Henry." There the defendant hired a room
expecting to view the coronation ceremonies from its windoivs. The ill-
ness of the king prevented the ceremonies. The court held that the par-
ties had impliedly agreed that the obligation of the contract should cease
in the event of the failure of the essential condition that a procession
take place. Thus prevention of performance by destruction. of the
subject matter was extended to frustration of the object because of the
non-existence of facts assumed to be the foundation of the agreement.
The test was no longer the objective one of-impossibility, as limited by
Taylor v. Caldwell. - Instead, the courts extended the range of implied
conditions by inquiring into the motive which induced the agreement
and constructing thereon a condition that the known object of the con-
tract must not be frustrated.'3
The decision in Johnson and Co. v. Kazenmekas (i924, Gonn.) 124
10 (1863, Q.B.) 3 B. & S..*826. It was said that the parties "must from the
beginning have known that it could not be fulfilled unless.... -some particular
specified thing continued to exist..., the contract is not to be construed as a
positive contract but as subject to an implied condition that the parties shall be
excused in case before breach performance became impossible from the perishing
of the thing without default of the contractor." For an earlier dictum see School
District v. Dauchy (1857) 25 Conn. 530.
See Anson, Contracts (Corbin's ed. igig) sec. 374.
"(i9o3, C. A.) 2 K. B. 740. See also Herne Bay Stham Boat Co. v. Hutton
(z9o3, C. A.) 2 K. B. 683.
'But in such cases the English courts refuse to create a duty of mutual resti-
tution- payments already made cannot be recovered and any payments due by
the contract before impossibility accrues are still recoverable. Chandler v.
Webster [i9o4, C. A.] i K. B. 493; Civil Service Cooperative Society v. General
Steam Navigation Co. [igo3, C. A.] 2 K. B. 756. Iii Scotland money advanced
before the impossibility accrued 'can be recovered on the ground of failure of
consideration. Cantiere San Rocco Shipbuilding Co. v. Clyde Shipbuilding Co.
(1923, H. L.) Scots L. T. 624. The latter view prevails in -the United States.
Butterfield v. Byron (i8gi) 153 Mass. 5x7, 27 N. E. 667; Jones-Gray Construction
Co. v. Stephens (I916) 167 Ky. 765, i81 S. W. 659; (1922) 31 YAm LAW
JOTRNAL, 416; (i923) 32 ibid. 844.
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Ati. 234, has called attention to the further development of the doc-
trine of "frustration of the commercial object" as applied to the novel
situations arising out of the war. --In that case the plaintiff sued to
recover the purchase price in dollars claimed upon a contract for the
sale of Russian rubles for delivery after the American embargo on
Russian currency should be lifted, tender by him having been made after
a long interval. The court held that the defendant was not excused from
performance since there was no implied condition that the rubles should
be delivered within a reasonable time. Clearly the decision is sound
since the embargo was specifically provided for and its actual duration
4
was no longer than might reasonably have been expected under the
circumstances of war. The utmost the defendant could urge was that
there was a frustration or impossibility in a commercial sense, but this,
too, must be excluded, since the doctrine has been invoked only in
cases where the impossibility arose subsequently to the making of the
agreement.
Prior to the war performance was excused where impossibility arose
from a change in the law of our own country making pre-existing con-
-tracts illegal,' 5 or, in rare cases, impossible rather than illegal.' 6 Dur-
ing the war -governmental regulation of industries was unprecedented
and the resulting interference with private contracts brought up new
problems in contract law. Conspicuous among these are the time charter
party problems. In the leading case of Tamplin S. S. Co. s. Anglo-
Mexican Petroleu'm Co. 7 the requisition by the government of a ship
which was under a charter having three years to run did not terminate
or suspend the charter. The court acknowledged the doctrine of frus-
tration, but deemed the interruption was not of such character .that a
condition should be implied. Yet in other decisions' 8 the Eourts recog-
nized the absence of reasonable expectation that the ship would be
released by the government for any use contemplated by the charter
during its term. Consequently, requisition and detention by the gov-
ernment, it was said, destroyed the identity of the chartered service and
privileged the charterer to treat the charter party as at an end.
"The embargo extended over a period of two years, but the plaintiff offered to
perform eight months after the contract was made. The case was dealt with as
if the embargo had been removed at this latter time. The market price of
rubiles had dropped from 2-75 to 12 cents per ruble in the interval between the
making of the contract and the removal of the -embargo.
- "Cowley v. No. P. R. R. (1g92) 68 Wash. 558, 123 Pac. 998; Jamieson v.
Indiana Natural Gas Co. (1891) 128"Ind. 555, 28 N. E. 76; Esposito v. Bowden
(1857, Q. B.) 7 El. & BL 762.
"Jewell v. Thompson (822, Ky.) 2 Litt. 52.
S[I916, H. L.] 2 A. C. 397; see also Modern Transportation Co. v. Duneric
S. S. Co. [1g'T, C. A.] i K B. 370.
'Anglo Northern Trading Co. v. Emlyn [1917] 2 K. B. 78; Countess of
Warwick S. S. Co. v. Le Nickel Societe Anonyme [gi8, C. A.] i K. B. 372;
Earn Line S. S. Co. v. Sutherland S. S. Co. (I918, S.D.N.Y.) 254 Fed. 126.
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Aside from the -maritime commercial decisions, the war brought up
similar problems in other branches of industry where there was a requi-
sitioning of the subject matter or the contemplated means of perform-
ance prior to the expiration of the time for performance. Here, too,
there is a considerable confusion in the application of the doctrine,
althouih there seems to be agreement as to the principles of frustration.
In Metropolitan Water Board v. Dick, Kerr and Co.,19 just prior to
the war the defendants contracted to make a reservoir to be completed
within six years.- A clause of the contract provided for,an extension
of- time if defendants were delayed in the work. The Minister of Muni-
tions caused the removal of the partially completed structure. The
Court of Appeal held that the suspension clause could not keep the con-
tract in existence under war conditions. But where the United States
Government commandeered the only available shipping space after the
seller had delivered only part of the goods, it was held that-this was no
excuse for failure to deliver all~when the seller sued the buyer for
refusing to accept the portion.20
The courts readily applied the pre-existing rule as to subsequent
illegality where -performance involved acts made illegal because of war-
time regulation.2 ' Performance which was neither illegal nor impos-
sible, but was likely to result in unreasonable loss of life or property
because of some threatened restraint,- was excused by the' Supreme
Court of the United States2 2 on the ground that the defendant's "duty
"[igi, H. L.] A. C. 11. For a similar; suspension clause see Naylor v.
Krainische Industrie Gesellschaft, supra note 5. Requisitioning of the subject
matter was treated as equivalent to destruction in In re Shipton, Anderson and Co.
[I915] 3 K. B. 676.
" But it was said this would have been a good defense if the buyer had
sued the seller for failure to ship the full amount. Prescott v. Powles (192o)
113 Wash. I77, 193 Pac. 68o. Impossibility as a defense in a suit for damages for
non-performance is to be distinguished from impossibility operating in favor of
the plaintiff as af, excuse for non-fulfillment of a condition precedent. See
Corbin, Impossibility of Performing Conditions Precedent (1922) 22 COL. L. REV.
421.
'Jersey Ice Cream Co. v. Banner Cone Co. (1920) 2o4 Ala. 532, 86 So. 382;
Anglo Russian Merchant Traders v. John Batt [1917, C. A.] 2 K. B. 679;
Allanwilde Transportation Co. v. Vocuunm Oil Co. (1919) 248 U. S. 377, 39
Sup. Ct. 147. Performance was not excused where the plaintiff repudiated before
a reasonable time had elapsed after the prohibition had become effective. Millar
& Co. v. Taylor & Co. (igi6, C. A.) I K. B. 4o2. And where a gas company
contracted to provide and maintain street lamps at a fixed sum per annum, a
regulation making street lighting illegal did not excuse performance of the duty
to pay the entire sum. Leiston Gas Co: v. Leistoncum Sisewell N. D. C. (1916,
C. A.) 2 K. B. 428.
' North Gernus Lloyd v. Guaranty Trust Co., supra note 4. A German
steamship "received gold in New York to be delivered in England. Before reach-
ing..this destination the master of the vessel returned to New York because of a
well founded apprehension of war and a possibility of seizure of his vessel and
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was constructively conditional upon the continued existence of a peaceful
prospect."2  But the difficulty of fixing the precise imminence of peril
which would make the restraint a present fact as contrasted with a fear
of future restraint led the court to a contrary conclusion in Watts and
Co. v. Miisui and Co. 24 It is apparent that in the majority of frustration
c ases during and immediately following the war the courts were decid-
ing each case upon its own facts in the process of creating a general
rule that was new in some of its aspects. These problems would not
normally arise except in time of war and it was no doubt inevitable that
.they should fail to achieve unanimity of decisioss,
The general acceptance of .the doctrine of "frustration of the com-
mercial object" has left a mere husk of the role in Paradine v. Jane;
it should be expressly repudiated and a new rule constructed. The
courts still refuse to excuse performance merely because of economic
unprofitableness. But in Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard2 5 where pro-
hibitive expense of excavation excused performance of- a contract to
deliver gravel, the court said "A thing is impossible in legal contem-
plation when it is not practicable and- a thing is impracticable when it
can only be done at an excessive and unreasonable cost." It is sub-
mitted that w hile the conclusion .in the Mineral Park case may be jus-
tified as an accommodation of judicial decree to the needs of modem
business, yet the doctrine must not be so extended as merely to let a party
escape from a bad speculation, the risk of which -ought to have been
within his contemplation when'-the contract was made.
detention of the German passengers. The court excused performance although
if all had gone well he might have delivered the gold and escaped capture by
the margin of a few hours.
' See Anson, Contracts (Corbin's Ed. i919) 428, note 2.
2 [igi7, H. L.] A. C. 227; see also Horlock ,. Beal [ig96, H. L.] i A. C. 486.
(ig6) z72 Calif. 289, 156 Pac. 458.
